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HOW QUOTAS MAY REDUCE 
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 
A quota at the free-trade level on foreign competition will generally lead to quality-upgrading of the 
low-quality firm, downgrading of the high-quality firm, an increase in average quality, and a reduction of 
domestic consumer surplus, irrespective of whether the foreign firm produces higher or lower quality. 
Effects of such a quota on industry profits and domestic welfare depend crucially on the direction of 
international vertical differentiation. If the foreign firm produces low quality, both firms' prices and 
profits rise but domestic welfare falls. This is consistent with some major effects of a Japanese VER in the 
US auto market and relevant empirical findings. If the foreign firm produces high quality, foreign profits 
will fall. Since domestic consumer surplus falls only unsubstantially, domestic profit gains lead to an 
increase of domestic welfare. 
1. Introduction 
According to recent theoretical studies of imper­
fect markets, quotas on foreign competition will in­
crease qualities, prices and profits of both domestic 
and foreign firms under fairly general assumptions 
(Falvey 1979, Rodriguez 1979, Das and Donnenfeld 
1987, Harris 1985, Krishna 1989 and 1990) 2. This 
view has also found widespread empirical support, 
for example, for the automobile industry (Feenstra 
1984, 1985, 1988, 1993; Goldberg 1992, 1994) 3. The 
above mentioned results obtain, since a quota im­
poses on firms a degree of collusion that they could 
not obtain otherwise. In doing that, it raises the mar­
ginal profitability of quality for both firms at the for­
mer free-trade qualities; and it does so even if the 
quota is not binding. Therefore, the quota also 
changes the nature of oligopolistic competition. This 
is the oligopolistic analogue to the case of a domestic 
monopoly (Bhagwati 1965). 
However, theoretical research by Krishna 
(1987), Das and Donnenfeld (1989), and Herguera, 
Kujal, Petrakis (1994) suggest that a quota could 
also lead to quality downgrading of the domestic or 
the foreign quality. Krishna analyzes a monopoly, 
while both the latter approaches assume a duopoly 
with Cournot competition in the last stage of the 
industry-game. However, the duopoly studies dif­
fer in the exact timing of the games analyzed. 
Krishna (1989) emphasizes the importance of 
the form of last stage game for the resulting pay­
off functions of the firms. Important attributes 
are the chosen strategic variables (prices, quanti­
ties), the form of the restrictions or policy vari­
ables (quotas, tariffs), the sequencing of the 
game (simultaneous, Leader-Follower, quality 
first or quality jointly with price, etc.). She 
shows that a quota will still lead to increased 
prices and profits for both firms for the case of 
differentiated substitute products and simultane­
ous price competition. But the price equilibrium 
will now involve mixed-strategies on the part of 
the domestic firm. Her modelling approach is 
closely related to work forwarded by Deneckere, 
Kovenock and Sohn (2000) on the effects of quotas 
and tariffs in a capacity-contraint duopoly with 
price competition. However, this work does not 
analyze the previous stage of quality choice, treat­
ing quality in effect as unchanged. But given the 
research received so far, effects on quality are 
just what we are interested i n 4 . Product quality 
is a strategic variable for the firm that can be 
influenced by trade p o l i c y 5 and especially by 
quotas or Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs). 
' Correspondence: Stefan H Lutz, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Department of Industrial Economics and Interna­
tional Management, L7, 1, D-68161 Mannheim, Germany, T. +49-621-1235-295 (F. -170) , E. lutz@zew.de. 
2 Falvey (1987), Rodriguez (1987), Das/Donnenfeld (1987) and Krishna (1987) deal with cases of perfect competition or monopoly. 
Other studies take oligopolistic competition into account but assume exogenously fixed product qualities (Leland 1979, Shapiro 1983). 
Harris (1985) and Krishna (1989) model in effect horizontal product differentiation and do not analyze effects on the quality stage. 
3 Similar findings have been forwarded by Boorstein and Feenstra (1991) for the steel industry, by Aw and Roberts (1986, 1988) for 
the footwear industry, and by Anderson (1985, 1991) for the cheese industry. Mintz (1973) found that U.S. quotas on meat, dairy products, 
textiles, and sugur lead to increased import qualities. 
4 Vertical quality differentiation («high» vs. «low» product quality) between substitutable products is, of course, an important dimen­
sion in international trade, since trade in differentiated but substitutable products (intra-industry trade) has grown most in the last decades. 
5 See also Levinsohn (1988), Feenstra (1993), Menzler-Hokkanen (1994). 
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The conceptual economic framework that ex­
plicitly includes these vertical quality aspects into 
the analysis is provided by models of vertical 
product differentiation. Using this approach, I show 
that a quota (near the free-trade level) on foreign 
competition will generally lead to quality-upgra­
ding (downgrading) of the low-quality (high-quality) 
firm, an increase in average product quality, a 
reduction of quality differentiation, and a reduc­
tion of domestic consumer surplus, irrespective 
of whether the foreign firm produces the higher 
or lower quality. The effects of a quota on indus­
try profits and domestic welfare depend crucially 
on the direction of international vertical differen­
tiation. If the foreign firm produces low quality, 
both firms' prices and profits will rise but do­
mestic welfare will fall. This describes well 
some major effects of a Japanese VER in the US 
auto market and relevant empirical findings If 
the foreign firm produces high quality, foreign 
profits will fall. Since domestic consumer sur­
plus falls only unsubstantially, domestic profit 
gains will lead to an overall increase of domestic 
welfare. 
For our m o d e l , analytical solutions for all 
equilibrium variables are available for the un­
regulated c a s e 3 and the case of a quota at the 
free-trade level. As for the unregulated case, so­
lutions for the free-trade-quota case are linear 
functions of the ratio of a market-size parameter 
(raised to some integer power) and a cost pa­
rameter 4 . The effects of changing the quota 
marginally starting at the free-trade level are 
investigated using simulations for benchmark 
values of market-size and cost parameters. These 
results are presented graphically 5. Changing 
these benchmark values does not suggest any 
qualitative changes in the results. Interpretation 
of these results also makes use of other analyti­
cal results presented so far in the literature. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol­
lows. Section 2 describes the basic analytical 
framework, the price and quality stages of the in­
dustry game, and the solution procedure. Section 3 
reviews the results. Section 4 presents discussions 
and concludes. 
2. Vertical Product Differentiation 
The standard model of duopolistic competition 
with endogenous product qualities has been devel­
oped since the beginning of the 80s (Mussa/Rosen 
1978, Gabszewicz/Thisse 1979, Shaked/Sutton 
1982, Ronnen 1991). Consumers have identical 
preferences and different incomes. The income 
differences lead to differences in the willingness to 
pay for a particular product quality. Two firms 
(domestic and foreign) offer products of different 
qualities in one (domestic) market. The firms bear 
quality-dependent costs and compete in qualities 
and prices in a two-stage industry game. Since 
higher product differentiation reduces substitutabil-
ity and price competition, even identical firms will 
offer distinct qualities in the resulting market equi­
librium. Trade will take place since the foreign 
firm operates in the domestic market. (In the two-
market extension, both firms operate in both mar­
kets.) National governments can use trade policy to 
improve the strategic position of domestic indus­
tries 6. There is also the possibility of strategic non-
cooperative interaction between two national gov­
ernments. 
2.1. The Model 
There are two firms, the domestic firm d and 
the foreign firm f, both competing in the domestic 
market. If both firms remain in the market, then 
they produce distinct goods, sold at prices pd and 
pf, respectively. The two products carry a single 
quality attribute denoted by sd and s f , respectively. 
Either firm faces production costs that are increas­
ing, convex (quadratic) functions of quality, the 
exact level of which depending on quality chosen 
and a quality cost parameter b. Marginal costs are 
equal to zero for both firms. Total costs of firm і 
are then: 
ci = bisi2 (1) 
In the domestic market, there is a continuum of 
consumers (indexed by t) distributed uniformly 
over the interval [0, T] with unit density 7. Each 
consumer purchases at most one unit of either firm 
d's product or firm fs product. The higher a con-
1 Empirical studies of the U.S. car market find quality upgrading also for U.S. cars. However, there are some conceptual problems with 
these studies that will be discussed at the end of the paper. This might indicate, that this empirical research at least supports the notion of 
reduced quality differentiation as a quota effect. Furthermore, a highly binding quota will still lead to quality upgrading of all products 
within the vertical-differentiation framework. 
2 The model setup used here is based on an earlier, unpublished paper presented at the ZEI, Bonn (Lutz 1997). 
3 These solutions and their derivation for the unregulated case are well-known (e. g. Ronnen 1991, Motta 1993, Lutz 1996). 
4 All solutions were obtained using Mathematica. 
5 The procedure is the same as in Lutz (1998), where the effects of tariffs where investigated. 
6 See e. g. Brander/Spencer 1984, Krishna 1989. 
7 The parameter t represents willingness to pay and increases with income. Let U[0,T] be the Uniform probability distribution. Then 
this distribution of consumers corresponds to T*U[0,T] with density T*1/(T - 0) = 1 for all t, regardless of the upper bound T. The total 
mass of consumers representing population size is equal to T, while the average income parameter T/2 represents per-capita income. 
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Figure 
2.2. Price Competition and Mixed Strategies 
The introduction of a quota substantially alters 
the price game between firms, leading to mixed-
strategy pricing by the domestic firm (but not the 
foreign firm). The domestic firm randomizes be-
tween a price that makes the quota binding on the 
foreign firm and a price that does not (leading to 
foreign quantity below the quota). If the quota is 
binding, we assume the rationing rule is given by 
costless arbitrage. This implies that the domestic 
firm faces a demand when making the quota bind-
ing that is identical to its demand if the foreign firm 
chooses a price to equate foreign demand with the 
quota (even though the foreign firm actually charges 
a lower price) The actual derivation of the price 
strategies and equilibria is identical to Krishna 
(1989, pp. 88-94) and is illustrated in Figure 2 . 
2.3. Quality Choice 
The derivation of quality best responses and 
equilibrium qualities is, in principle, almost identi-
cal to the derivation of the results without regula-
tion shown in the appendix. The only difference is, 
1 Boccard/Wauthy (1998) discuss the the existence of a case where this rationing rule is violated. Such a case may arise when the 
foreign firm offers low quality and due to the fundamental asymmetry given by vertical product differentiation. Given that a foreign low-
quality firm is restricted by a quota, a domestic high-quality firm now has an alternative choice of capturing foreign customers at the lower 
end of the income distribution by price (and quality) decreases. However, since in our model setup, cost of quality development are 
assumed to be independent of quantity produced and high quality is not fixed, the resulting high-quality profits and marginal profits are so 
high as to prevent this case. 
2 For the case of costless production and a fixed higher quality, the derivation of price strategy and equilibria is also developed in 
Boccard/Wauthy (1998). Consequently their free-trade setup is based on Choi/Shin (1992). 
The straight lines pbrd and pbr f are the domestic 
and foreign free-trade price best responses, respec-
tively. As usual they are both upward-sloping. 
Since the foreign firm produces low quality, its 
best response starts from the origin. Originally, the 
foreign firm is not quota-constrained when moving 
upward along ist best response since ist optimal 
price choice is high relative to domestic price. The 
line p q r f denotes the ratio of domestic to foreign 
price choice such that the quota would be exactly 
binding. It becomes the foreign firm's best re-
sponse from the point of their intersection. 
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Table 1. Results 
that revenue und consumer surplus functions are 
now convex combinations of the respective func­
tions given one of two domestic price realizations. 
The relative weights are given by the probability α 
that the domestic firm chooses the higher price which 
makes the quota binding. As for the unregulated case, 
solutions for the free­trade­quota case are linear func­
tions of the ratio of a market­size parameter (raised to 
some integer power) and a cost parameter . These 
solutions are reported in Table 1. 
Some changes in the properties of quality best 
responses are discussed below. The existence of a 
quota flattens both quality best responses. A quota­
constrained firm faces a lower resulting revenue 
increase from a quality increase, because its 
quantity is constrained. If it increases quality, it 
will also strongly increase price since it cannot 
gain much through quantity increases The 
unconstrained firm will react with a (costless) price 
increase rather than a (costly) quality increase. For 
the case of a quota on the foreign low­quality firm, 
this even leads to a slightly negative slope of the 
high­quality best response. 
3. Quotas on Foreign Competition 
A quota at the free­trade level on foreign com­
petition will generally lead to quality­upgrading 
(downgrading) of the low­quality (high­quality) 
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firm, an increase in average product quality, a re­
duction of quality differentiation, and a reduction 
of domestic consumer surplus, irrespective of 
whether the foreign firm produces the higher or 
lower quality. But the effects of a quota on indus­
try profits and domestic welfare depend crucially 
on the direction of international vertical differen­
tiation. 
If the foreign firm produces low quality, both 
firms' prices and profits will rise but domestic wel­
fare will fall. The fall in domestic welfare is due to 
three effects: high quality decreases, prices rise, 
total quantity bought (of both goods) falls. The last 
effect reduces market participation (share of con­
sumers buying either good) to such an extent, that 
this negative effect overcompensates for an in­
crease in average quality. The increase in average 
quality is the result of the reduced market share of 
the low-quality product. 
If the foreign firm produces high quality, for­
eign profits will fall. The foreign firm is bound by 
the quota, but it cannot profitably increase its al­
ready high and costly quality. Since its quantity 
must be reduced, it actually needs to decrease its 
quality. However, the domestic low-quality firm 
increases quality substantially. This leads to a de­
crease in quality-adjusted price of the low-quality 
good while the high quality good becomes rela­
tively more expensive. For the consumers as a 
whole, these two effects almost cancel out. There­
fore, domestic consumer surplus falls only unsub­
stantially, and domestic profit gains will lead to an 
overall increase of domestic welfare. 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
The standard empirical case cited is the develop­
ment of the US car market during the 1980s, where 
Japanese imports where subjected to both quantity 
constraints and tariffs. To my knowledge, there is no 
closure yet on the debate whether quality upgrading 
was induced by tariffs, VERs, or a combination of 
both. However, the general notion is that the quality 
of Japanese cars was initially lower than that of U.S. 
cars, and that it was upgraded. Feenstra (1993) re­
ports a quality increase of Japanese cars. Goldberg 
(1992, 1994) performed trade-policy simulations us­
ing an econometric model of US car demand, coming 
to the conclusion that quotas lead to quality upgrad­
ing, while tariffs might lead to downgrading. Gold­
berg also reports quality-upgrading for U.S. cars, 
while Feenstra does not analyze the effects on U.S. 
cars. I want to argue that the case of a quota on a low-
quality foreign firm in my model describes the U.S-
Japan auto case well. 
1 All solutions were obtained using Mathematica. They are available upon request. 
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On first glance, Goldberg's results seem to con­
tradict two of my theoretical results. These are de­
creased quality differentiation and a decrease in 
high quality. However, Goldberg infers an increase 
of quality for U.S. products from a demand shift 
towards higher-quality car models. She does not 
actually analyze any quality change of these car 
models. This result is arguably better comparable 
to my theoretical result of average quality in­
creases. From anectodal evidence (for example 
comparisons of reliability of Japanese and U.S. 
cars in the 1980s), I would also argue that the first 
reaction of U.S. car firms the quotas was to not put 
as much effort into quality improvement of their 
own models as they would have done otherwise. 
It is also noteworthy, that this theoretical model 
predicts the same tariff effects as shown in Gold­
berg's work, namely a quality decrease (see also 
Lutz 1998). Noting that the tariff affects low-
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ЯК КВОТИ МОЖУТЬ ЗМЕНШИТИ 
МІЖНАРОДНУ ДИФЕРЕНЦІАЦІЮ ПРОДУКЦІЇ 
За умов вільної торгівлі при міжнародній конкуренції квота зазвичай зумовлює підвищення кон­
курентоспроможності фірми, знижуючи конкурентоспроможність фірми з вищою якістю, а 
також збільшення середньої якості, зменшення внутрішнього споживчого надлишку, незалежно 
від того, чи іноземна фірма виробляє продукцію вищої чи нижчої якості. Вплив такої квоти на 
прибутки промисловості та вітчизняний добробут великою мірою залежить від напряму міжна­
родної вертикальної диференціації. Якщо іноземна фірма виробляє низькоякісну продукцію, ціни 
та прибутки обох фірм збільшуються, але внутрішній (вітчизняний) добробут спадає. Це узго­
джується з деяким вагомим впливом японських добровільних експортних обмежень на авторинку 
автомобілів США та певними емпіричними спостереженнями. Якщо іноземна фірма виробляє 
продукцію високої якості, іноземні прибутки спадатимуть. Оскільки внутрішній споживчий над­
лишок знижується незначно, виграші внутрішнього прибутку ведуть до збільшення вітчизняного 
добробуту. 
